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In developing countries where elections are costly and accountability mechanisms weak, politicians 
often turn to illicit means of financing campaigns. This paper examines one such channel of illicit 
campaign finance: India’s real estate sector. Politicians and builders allegedly engage in a quid pro 
quo, whereby the former park their illicit assets with the latter, and the latter rely on the former for 
favorable dispensation. At election time, however, builders need to re-route funds to politicians as 
a form of indirect election finance. One observable implication is that the demand for cement, the 
indispensible raw material used in the sector, should contract during elections since builders need 
to inject funds into campaigns. Using a novel monthly-level data set, we demonstrate that cement 
consumption does exhibit a political business cycle consistent with our hypothesis. Additional tests 
provide confidence in the robustness and interpretation of our findings.
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In democracies across the developed and developing worlds, there is concern that the costs 
of elections are growing unabated (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). In the United States, the Federal 
Election Commission calculates that candidates contesting the 2008 presidential election 
spent nearly $1.8 billion, almost three times what was spent in the 2004 presidential election 
cycle and almost four times the 1996 figures.1 On the other side of the globe, economists 
estimate that candidates and parties in the 2009 Indian national elections spent roughly $3 
billion on campaign expenditures. Election spending alone is said to have increased India’s 
GDP growth by .5 percent for two quarters of 2009 (Timmons and Kumar 2009).  
Yet one key difference between democracies in the developed and the developing worlds is 
the alleged role that illicit election funds play in the latter. In developed democracies, there 
are well-established systems of monitoring and accounting for election finance and for 
prosecuting those involved in alleged improprieties. The strength of these systems likely 
deters the transfer of illicit funds to a great extent.2 In developing countries, however, 
scholars and observers have widely reported that illicit campaign finance expenditures often 
dwarf legal flows. As one scholar has noted, this reality is often referred to as the “rule of 
ten”—the idea that actual election expenditures are ten times the reported amounts 
(Gingerich 2010). While there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence regarding the presence of 
illicit (or “black”) money in elections, there has been little empirical analysis of these flows, 
and for obvious reasons. By their very nature, flows of “black” money are opaque: they 
involve under-the-table transfers that are largely unobservable and therefore difficult to 
quantify. Yet black money can potentially undermine voters’ confidence in the democratic 
process and can lead to severe governance failures.  
In this paper, we examine one much-discussed channel of black money in Indian politics: the 
construction and real estate sector. In recent years, there has been growing speculation of 
cozy links between builders and politicians. The most common allegation proceeds along the 
                                                       
1 These figures are in nominal terms, and include primary and general election spending as well as the costs 
of the nominating conventions. They do not include independent expenditures. See 
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml.  
2 Of course, in countries such as the United States, there are real questions about the influence licit lobbying 
expenditures and campaign finance donations from industry can have on legislator behavior. For recent examples 
from the U.S. housing crisis, see Igan, Mishra and Tressel 2011; and Mian, Sufi and Trebbi 2010.   
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following lines. Politicians in India often accumulate substantial assets while in office, above 
and beyond their official remuneration. In order to hide these assets from scrutiny and to 
invest them productively, many politicians park these assets with builders involved in real 
estate, a sector that has averaged annual growth rates of nearly ten percent over the last 
decade. Builders require the aid of politicians because politicians have ensured that land 
remains a highly regulated commodity over which the state has significant discretion. 
Furthermore, the real estate sector perennially needs large volumes of liquidity, much larger 
than banks are willing to finance. Thus, while politicians channel money to the sector and 
provide discretionary access to land, builders in turn help to launder these funds safely in a 
rapidly appreciating asset. More importantly for the purposes of this paper, at the time of 
elections developers route part of these funds back to the politicians to help finance their 
election campaigns. Although the aforementioned narrative is backed up by numerous 
journalistic accounts as well as interviews with businessmen, politicians and government 
officials conducted by the authors, this chain of events are nonetheless empirically unproven. 
This paper seeks to address this lacuna by assessing empirically whether fluctuations in 
construction activities are linked to electoral cycles in India. In so doing, it aims to shed light 
on the acknowledged, though understudied, role of black money in Indian elections. While 
we are not able to test each link in the causal chain empirically, we believe that the presence 
of electoral cycles serves as suggestive evidence of the kinds of activities we describe here. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that what money is to elections, cement is to construction—it is 
the indispensible ingredient. Virtually all construction requires cement (for which there is no 
material substitute), and the burgeoning real estate sector accounts for the majority of India’s 
domestic cement demand. When construction activity increases, cement consumption rises 
and vice versa. If therefore, the real estate sector is a key financier of elections, then just 
prior to elections, builders will need to provide the liquidity to politicians to finance their 
electoral campaigns. In turn, this will constrain the liquidity available to builders for their 
own activities; as a result, construction activity should drop from the expected trend—and 
so should cement consumption.  
To assess the relationship between elections and activity in the real estate sector empirically, 
we construct a novel panel dataset comprising information on the monthly consumption of 
cement and the timing of elections in India’s 17 major states over the period 1995 to 2010. 
Using an empirical model that controls for unobserved state and time-specific effects, we 
investigate whether the presence of elections is associated with an observable drop in cement 
consumption, which is consistent with a drying up of liquidity in the real estate sector 
around election time. 
To preview our findings, we find that there is a statistically significant contraction in cement 
consumption (representing a 12 to 15 percent decline) during the month of state assembly 
elections. This effect is slightly larger for scheduled elections, state (as opposed to national) 
elections, dual elections (when elections to the state assembly and national parliament occur 
concurrently), and for more urban states. To assess the robustness of this result, we use 
randomization inference (Rader 2011) as a non-parametric method of testing the null  
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hypothesis that there is no relationship between elections and a decline in cement 
consumption.  
Having built confidence in our core finding, we address three plausible challenges to our 
interpretation of the results: that the decline is indicative of a broader decline in economic 
activity due to political uncertainty (or what some authors have called a “reverse business 
cycle”); that builders should anticipate a liquidity crunch and smooth consumption over 
time; and that decreases in cement consumption are due to a pre-electoral slowdown in 
government investment. We demonstrate that these concerns do not invalidate our results.  
Our findings have broad relevance for the study of money politics in the developing world, 
where we are most likely to observe illicit election finance. There is a small, but growing 
literature in this area (see Kupferschmidt 2009 for one review; and Gingerich 2010 for a 
unique empirical example from Brazil). This paper adds to this literature in two ways. First, it 
focuses on a specific sector—real estate—that is widely thought to be linked with “off-the-
books” politics across the developing world. Second, it contributes a novel measure for 
capturing election cycles in this sector that is consistent with its role as a source of election 
finance. 
Our findings are also broadly related to the field of “forensic” economics, which has 
developed innovative methods of estimating the private returns to political power. Work in 
this area attempts to estimate the extent to which firms benefit from possessing political 
connections (Fisman 2001; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Faccio 2006; 
Jayachandran 2006; and Goldman, Rocholl and So 2009). A second strand of the literature 
attempts to identify the benefits politicians obtain on the basis of their political power 
(Eggers and Hainmueller 2009; Querubin and Snyder 2011; Bhavnani 2011). In contrast to 
this larger literature, we place an emphasis on the role of election finance incentives rather 
than mere rent seeking (though one notable exception is Sukhtankar 2011). 
Given the centrality of the election cycle to our argument, this paper is also linked to the 
literature on political business cycles (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004; Khemani 2004; Shi 
and Svensson 2006; Brender and Drazen 2005; Cole 2008). Yet, like Sukhtankar (2011), our 
paper is unique in that our core hypothesis predicts a contraction in activity (within a specific 
sector) around elections. This stands in contrast to much of the political business cycle 
literature, which is premised around an expansion of economic activity around election time.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we analyze the 
drivers of election expenditures, including the shift toward private financing. We then briefly 
review the workings of the alleged quid pro quo between politicians and builders and present 
our hypotheses. In the fourth section, we outline the data and methods used to assess our 
hypotheses empirically. Next, we present statistical evidence in support of our primary 
hypotheses on election timing and cement consumption. To build confidence in the result, 
we address some of the most plausible challenges to our interpretation of the findings. 
Finally, we conclude by summarizing the implications of our findings for the literature,  
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emphasizing the need for a research agenda on the impact of election finance on democracy 
and development outcomes. 
2. The Indian context 
Money is an essential ingredient of democratic politics; it is used to finance parties, mobilize 
voters and conduct political campaigns. And there is a deeply held belief among students of 
Indian politics that the costs of elections have skyrocketed in recent years. Taking a step 
back, in the abstract we might postulate that democratic elections have become more costly, 
with costs increasing in: a) the size of constituencies; b) the intensity of political competition; 
c) the number of elections; and d) the weakness of non-electoral systems of accountability. 
In our judgment, conditions a) through c) are clearly satisfied in India while d) presents a 
mixed picture. But it is clear we are seeing an increasing flow of money for elections, as well 
as a shift toward greater reliance on private mechanisms of campaign finance. 
2.1 Factors influencing the cost of elections 
First, as India’s population has grown, the size of political constituencies has ballooned. 
While the median parliamentary constituency in 1952 (the date of India’s first post-
independence elections) had fewer than 300,000 voters, today’s parliamentary constituencies 
contain between 1.5 and 2 million people. The growth in the size of the electorate over time 
means that candidates have to spend more money to woo potential supporters.  
Second, there has been a marked increase in the competitiveness of Indian elections. The 
decline of the Congress system and the dawn of the coalition era in Delhi provided direct 
incentives for leaders to form new parties (Ziegfeld 2010). According to Sridharan (2009), 
the number of national parties declined from 8 to 6 between 1989-2004, while the number 
of state parties increased from 20 to 36 and the number of registered parties doubled from 
85 to 173.3 Competition has also added to electoral uncertainty, meaning that parties find it 
increasingly difficult to calculate the elasticity of votes to expenditures.4 
Third, the scope of elections has increased dramatically over the last two decades. The 73rd 
and 74th Amendments to the Constitution (1992-1993) formally established a three-tier 
system of democratic governance at the local levels, adding nearly 2.9 million new elected 
positions to India’s democratic patchwork (and, hence, the increased need for election 
finance). Political parties field candidates at all three levels, even at the village level where 
formal partisan affiliations are prohibited, though regularly brandished.  
                                                       
3 In 1977, 2,439 candidates from 35 parties contested parliamentary elections across 543 parliamentary 
constituencies. By 2009, the numbers had risen to 8,070 candidates and 207 parties. Authors’ calculations, based 
on grouping Independents together as a single political party. The trends are similar for state assembly elections. 
4 In the post-Congress era, an additional factor contributing to electoral uncertainty is incumbency 
disadvantage (Uppal 2009).   
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Fourth, non-electoral mechanisms of accountability could help control the rising costs of 
elections, yet their uneveness has limited their effectiveness. Political parties, for instance, are 
poorly organized and weakly institutionalized; hence, they are not able (or willing) to regulate 
election spending internally. Furthermore, parties are not able to cover the funds needed to 
for contest elections from their own coffers. While all parties collect membership dues, they 
are marginal to the cost of fighting elections. Without strong party organizations, candidates 
have had to look elsewhere for creative ways to accumulate campaign-related resources. 
State regulation of election finance could curb rising costs, but here too the results have been 
disappointing. The thirst for election finance could be partially offset if elections were state 
funded, which could curb the demand for private financing. But in India, state funding does 
not exist. Furthermore, there is a yawning gap between de facto versus de jure election finance 
regulations. Under law, parliamentary candidates cannot spend more than Rs. 1-2.5 million, 
while assembly candidates can spend between Rs. 0.5-1.0 million (the exact amount varies by 
state) per election, but these spending limits have unrealistically low ceilings and numerous 
loopholes. On the contributions side, efforts to regulate corporate contributions have not 
changed the under-the-table pattern of party funding. As Sridharan (2009) notes: “[T]he 
potential costs and risks of transparency largely outweigh any tax benefits. In a still fairly 
discretionarily regulated economy, transparent donors run the risk of being penalized by 
parties in power at the state or center that are unhappy with who and in what amounts a 
company donates funds.”  
New disclosure requirements have also been, at best, a partial success. For instance, 
candidates are required to disclose their campaign expenditures within 30 days of the 
election, yet there is often no incentive for the candidates to comply because authorities have 
very little motivation to follow up once the election is completed. And even when candidates 
do disclose campaign expenditures, the disclosures are often farcical.5  
It is, of course, difficult to create a proper accounting of the scale of illicit election finance. A 
1999 independent election audit in 24 parliamentary constituencies found that the average 
winner spent Rs. 8.3 million (when the limit ranged from 1.0-2.5 million) (Sridharan 2006). 
Recent interdictions by the Election Commission of India (ECI) are also instructive. In 
advance of the 2011 state assemly elections in Tamil Nadu, the ECI seized Rs. 600 million 
(or $13.3 million) in illicit cash that was intended for election purposes (Economic Times, May 
12, 2011).6 Of course, we do not know how much illicit money was actually spent, only what 
                                                       
5 The average candidate in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections reported spending around half the legal limit, a fact 
that does not comport with the ground realities of Indian elections (ADR 2009). 
6 In one instance, a ruling party aide was arrested while carrying illicit campaign cash along with a detailed 
diary of distributions. In one municipal ward alone, the party distributed Rs. 2.4 million (Krishnan 2011). If we 
assume these funds were distributed equally to all voters, this amounts to roughly Rs. 200 per voter (nearly seven 
times the daily urban poverty rate of Rs. 33).  
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the ECI was able to recover through its investigative operations (which itself is likely a small 
fraction).  
Finally, other non-electoral mechanisms of accountability—namely civil society and the 
media—have had mixed success tracking the money trail. Thanks to public interest litigation 
filed by civil society organizations, the Supreme Court of India ruled in 2003 that all 
candidates must disclose their personal financial assets/liabilities. These affidavits have shed 
tremendous light on the influence of money in India’s elected bodies (Vaishnav 2011). Yet, 
they contain no information on election expenditures. India has a long tradition of a free 
media, and they too have often played a role in exposing improprieties in election finance. 
Yet, unfortunately, some news organizations have become part of the problem themselves 
(Economic and Political Weekly 2009). In 2010, the Press Council of India documented several, 
high-profile instances of “cash for coverage,” whereby politicians and journalists exchanged 
money for favorable coverage. 
2.2 Mechanisms of private financing 
The stylized facts of the Indian system described above point to incentives for private 
financing of elections, which in turn, open the door to methods of “off-the-books” or illicit 
financing. To quench the thirst for such financing, there are at least five mechanisms that 
seem to be growing in intensity.  
First, parties are actively recruiting candidates involved in serious criminal activity because 
they possess both the financial resources and the connections necessary to contest elections 
successfully. Vaishnav (2011) argues that one of the most important demand-side 
explanations for the “criminalization” of politics in India is the fact that alleged criminal 
candidates have significant financial assets at their disposal that allow them to self-finance.  
Second, there is a growing number of businessmen directly contesting national elections. 
Sinha (2010) estimates that businessmen constitute 22 percent of the Lok Sabha (lower 
house of Parliament) and 16 percent of the Rajya Sabha (upper house of Parliament). These 
figures represent significant increases over the last decade—and possibly understate the 
increase, given the lack of transparency concerning members’ business interests. 
Businessmen or not, the membership of elected bodies is increasingly being restricted to a 
plutocratic minority. More than 50 percent of both chambers of parliament are crorepatis or 
the Indian equivalent of millionaires ( one “crore” rupees is equivalent to Rs. 10 million or 
about $225,000), while the average wealth of a state-level Member of the Legislative 
Assembly (MLA) is 1.28 crores (Vaishnav 2011). 
Third, wealthy individuals are not only contesting elections directly but they are also 
bankrolling entire political movements. For instance, the Reddy bothers (a sibling trio of 
mining magnates) from Karnataka have used their vast mining wealth to bankroll the BJP’s 
rise to power in that state. As a reward, two of the three brothers received cabinet berths 
while the third was awarded directorship of a powerful state corporation (Sanjana 2008).  
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Fourth, many parties are said to readily accept payment in exchange for party nominations 
(“tickets,” in the Indian parlance). Indeed, Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mayawati readily 
admitted that asking candidates to “make a donation to the party” was a key component of 
her BSP party’s election strategy, with the proceeds derived from ticket buying used to 
subsidize less well-off candidates (Pradhan 2006).  
Finally, parties and their private sector allies launder funds through domestic and 
international markets. Since the onset of economic liberalization in 1991 India has become 
much more integrated with the global economy, making it easier to move money into and 
out of the country. As a result, high net-worth individuals and participants in India’s 
underground economy have begun stashing their assets abroad to take advantage of 
generous foreign tax regimes. Assets sent abroad can also be repatriated for domestic use 
under the guise of foreign investment and are widely reported to be a source of election 
financing (Jaffrelot 2002).7 And funds can also be laundered domestically. It is one such 
channel—real estate—that we turn to in the next section.  
 3. The real estate channel 
To date, we are not aware of any scholarly empirical work that examines the connections 
between the real estate sector and India’s political leaders. In this section, we describe why 
the sector is an important conduit for illicit election finance.  
3.1 The builder-politician nexus 
We start with the premise that the more regulatory intensive the sector, the more its rent 
extractive potential (Djankov et al. 2002). Indeed the major sources of political corruption 
(and illicit election financing) in India come from the sectors that are most heavily regulated–
natural resources, spectrum allocation and defense—because they offer the most scope for 
discretion by politicians.8 In the case of the real estate sector the need for regulatory 
forbearance requires constant political favors because the acquisition and use of land is 
intensely politically and bureaucratically regulated. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta (2010) writes, 
“The discretionary power the state has with respect to land is the single biggest source of 
corruption” in India. 
                                                       
7 A report by Global Financial Integrity, a Washington, DC-based think tank, estimates that between 1948 
and 2008 India lost around $213 billion in illicit financial flows. The report surmises that these funds were the 
product of corruption; bribery and kickbacks; criminal activity; and efforts by citizens to shelter their wealth from 
domestic tax authorities (Kar 2011). 
8 Indeed, some of India’s most infamous corruption scandals involved bribery and kickbacks whereby 
politicians traded policy discretion for cash, some portion of which is alleged to have financed political activities. 
These include the Bofors and Tehelka.com scandals (defense); the Madhu Koda case (mining); and the 2G 
telecom scandal (spectrum).  
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Real estate has several attributes which makes it an obvious choice for black money. We 
assume that it is easier for politicians to accumulate resources than to hide them. When 
politicians want to hide the true value of their assets, they need a financial mechanism that 
has the features of a bank without the traceability of a physical account. We stipulate the 
mechanism should have at least three features:  
a) Absorptive capacity: It should have the ability to absorb large amounts of money quickly and 
directly 
b) Liquid assets: It should be able to carry liquid assets (i.e. the money should be available 
when needed) 
c) Contract enforcement: It should offer some mechanisms for contract enforcement  
Real estate possesses all these characteristics. As one of the principal industries in India—
recent estimates suggest real estate accounts for over seven percent of India’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP)—it can absorb large volumes of cash. The Indian government 
estimates that there will be a need to construct 26.5 million new houses to keep up with 
current demand (Planning Commission 2008). Still, banks have been wary of lending to this 
sector, for three reasons. First, banks are concerned about speculative bubbles in the 
housing sector. Second, because many of the underlying land transactions are executed “in 
the black” and might be of dubious legality, firms seeking funds might think twice about 
seeking bank financing.9 Third, there are few barriers to entry for builders seeking to join the 
marketplace, and banks are likely reluctant to finance builders without established track 
records.  
Finally, the sector’s regulatory intensity not only makes it a boon for raising funds but also 
provides politicians with a mechanism to enforce its “contract” with builders. The rules that 
governed land use a century ago are still in force today, as there is little incentive for 
politicians to alter the status quo given the benefits that are accrued under the current system 
(Pai 2011).10 The primary piece of legislation governing land acquisition (the Land 
Acquisition Act) was written in 1894 by British colonial authorities. This and other laws, 
such as the Urban Land Ceiling Act, created a regulatory structure that empowered 
bureaucrats (and the politicians who oversee them) to control and manipulate the 
distribution of urban land. The resulting bureaucratic maze has created myriad methods of 
rent seeking (Srinivas 1991). The discretionary use of authority means that politicians can 
also take steps to punish builders who do not support them during elections.  
                                                       
9 For instance, governments often sell land to private developers at sub-market rates, where the differential 
between the government and market price is the size of the kickback. Firms cannot obtain official financing 
based on the actual purchase price, because this would expose the corruption premium. 
10 It is important here to distinguish between sectors of the economy that are under the purview of the 
federal government and those that are state subjects. The liberalizing reforms that took place in India during the 
early 1990s focused on the former category. The central government cannot mandate reform of sectors primarily 
under the states’ control.  
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The affinity between builders and politics is not unique to India; in fact, the comparative 
literature is littered with similar examples. One of the more memorable examples comes 
from Chubb’s (1982) work on Palermo, Sicily. She describes the quid pro quos between 
builders, the local administration and the mafia that shaped the city’s post-war urban 
development. The sequence of events bears close resemblance to the situation in India. 
Local Palermo politicians used their regulatory leverage to provide preferred access to 
builders in exchange for political support and campaign contributions. Authors have 
described similar scenarios in the Philippines (Sidel 1999); Thailand (Ockey 1998); and 
machine-era America (Erie 1988, Chapter 2).11 
3.1 How the quid pro quo works 
In this section, we briefly review how the quid pro quo between politicians and builders 
operates. There are three basic stages. In the first stage, politicians accumulate resources 
while in office. Although the salaries for MLAs and Members of Parliament (MPs) are 
modest, studies have shown that the asset holdings of many elected politicians are often 
disproportionately large.12 Estimating the financial rewards to office is a difficult enterprise 
due to the variety of ways politicians can hide their assets from public scrutiny, but in recent 
years there have been numerous allegations of rent-seeking: chief ministers of at least six 
states have been investigated for “disproportionate assets” (and a seventh has been arrested 
for money laundering) (see also Bhavnani 2011). 
Once politicians accumulate assets, they require a place to invest these assets where they can 
avoid public scrutiny while earning a decent return. Because land is a valuable commodity 
and India’s real estate industry is booming as the size of the middle class expands, many 
politicians are thought to deposit a portion of their assets with real estate developers. 
Politicians’ links with builders typically take three forms. First, relatives of politicians often 
establish their own real estate development firms and reap the rewards from the value of 
their familial connections. In other cases, politicians become covert backers of firms because 
they represent powerful entities whose support must be won and retained.13 One illustrative 
case comes from the prosperous Western state of Gujarat. A 2001 investigation by the news 
magazine Outlook revealed that a quarter of ministers in the state cabinet had links with real 
                                                       
11 Although it is not a focus of this paper, many of the studies cited document a triangular connection 
between the mafia or other organized crime groups, politicians and real estate/construction interests. See 
Weinstein (2008) for one perspective on the illicit nexus between politicians, the bureaucracy and the mafia in 
Mumbai’s real estate market. 
12 A 2009 civil society analysis of re-contesting MPs reported their assets increased, on average, by 289 
percent while in office (Thakur 2011). An econometric analysis found less outlandish gains, but concluded that 
between 5-8 percent of MLAs and MPs have “suspect wealth” above what their official remuneration would 
suggest (Bhavnani 2011).  
13 While politicians have leverage over builders, the reverse is also true. One MP in Maharashtra, concerned 
about a crackdown on state discretion over land, lamented: “Which builder will give you money during elections 
if his work is not done?” (Khetan 2011).  
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estate developers. The politicians, the report argues, colluded with state-level bureaucrats 
who granted favorable dispensation to the politician’s preferred builders (Bhushan 2001). 
On occasion politicians will have a direct financial stake in real estate development. 
Typically, however, his or her interest begins as a secret, and only becomes public knowledge 
when scandals erupt. For example, the recent history of Maharashtra contains numerous 
examples of powerful state politicians with direct or indirect financial interests in real estate, 
whose interests are not a matter of public record until civil society groups or the media 
expose the connection (Khetan 2011).14  
In the third and final stage of the quid pro quo, builders transfer back to politicians assets 
that can be used to offset election expenses. In the case of family-owned firms, politicians 
can embezzle or transfer funds from family firms as a way of channeling money for elections 
(as in Sukhtankar 2011). When there is no direct familial connection, the mechanism can be 
a simple under-the-table transfer or an in-kind contribution. Although builders have to 
transfer funds back to politicians around elections, the transaction brings long-term benefits 
in terms of future favors, permits, and goodwill.15  
Recent revelations from India’s massive 2G telecommunications spectrum scandal provide 
some limited insight into these hypothesized stages of the quid pro quo. In early 2011, the 
government charged A. Raja, the Union Minister of Telecommunications, with underpricing 
the sale of the 2G telecommunications spectrum and manipulating the spectrum allocation 
process in favor of selected companies.16 According to the government, Raja, an MP from 
Tamil Nadu and a confidant of that state’s Chief Minister, helped a telecom company (which 
served as a front for the country’s third largest real estate developer) win access to 2G 
licenses. The government alleges that the developer transferred around $40 million in 
kickbacks, through a serious of shadowy transactions emanating from real estate entities, to a 
television network controlled by the family of Tamil Nadu’s Chief Minister (Shenoy 2011).  
3.2 Hypotheses on cement consumption 
Analyzing activity in India’s real estate sector, both over time and at the sub-national level, 
presents difficulties for measurement. Unlike in many developed economies, there are no 
reliable measures of building activity—at last at sufficiently meaningful levels of 
disaggregation. To circumvent this shortcoming, we use data on the amount of cement that 
is consumed in the major states of India on a monthly basis over a 15-year period. Cement 
consumption represents a suitable proxy for real estate building activity for two reasons. 
                                                       
14 One investigation into the builder-politician nexus in Maharashtra suggests that in Mumbai, “almost every 
MLA and MP, both past and present, cutting across party lines, owns at least one real estate project, either 
directly or through family members or a proxy, at any given point in time” (Khetan 2011). 
15 A former Congress MLA is quoted as remarking: “For builders, raising funds for candidates during 
elections is not a favour, but a transaction which can be encashed at a later date” (India Realty News 2009).  
16 India’s comptroller estimates the improprieties could have caused losses to the government worth around 
$39 billion.  
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First, cement is the indispensable ingredient in virtually all real estate construction; it has no 
obvious substitute as a binding agent for building materials. As such, it is a reasonable 
barometer for construction activity. Second, industry research estimates that real estate 
accounts for between 65 and 75 percent of India’s domestic cement demand (with 
infrastructure accounting for the remainder) (India Brand Equity Foundation n.d.). Thus, we 
are confident that changes in the extent of building activity are highly correlated with 
fluctuations in cement consumption.  
Our core hypothesis is that cement consumption should contract during the month of the 
election (denoted in the analysis as Election). Because real estate developers must transfer 
back to politicians resources invested with them as elections near, one would expect activity 
in the sector to slow down during the four-week campaign period prior to Election Day. 
This is because existing liquidity in the sector should dry up as resources otherwise slated for 
construction must be channeled out of the sector and into the hands of politicians and 
parties (Hypothesis #1).  
Next, we hypothesize that the contraction in cement demand should be larger during 
scheduled elections (Scheduled Election) compared to unscheduled elections. When elections 
occur on time (once every five years), builders and politicians have an ex ante schedule to 
guide their transactions. When unscheduled elections are held— say, if a government loses a 
vote of no confidence and/or the government falls—it might be more difficult for builders 
to adjust their activities accordingly. We expect that, in the case of scheduled elections, there 
is sufficient time for politicians and builders to coordinate (Hypothesis #2). Furthermore, 
since elections in a parliamentary system can be considered endogenous, it could be the case 
that unscheduled elections are related to economic factors that are correlated with changes in 
the real estate sector. We can address this by separating out the effects of scheduled versus 
unscheduled elections.  
In India’s federal system, the state—as opposed to the national government—is the primary 
regulator of the land and building activity sectors. Hence, rents emanating from real estate 
are more relevant for state level politicians, while rents from spectrum or defense deals 
accrue to politicians at the national level. However, we expect that we should still observe a 
significant effect for national elections as firms also stand to benefit from connections to 
politicians in parliament. Therefore, we expect that the contraction in cement consumption 
will be significant in national elections (Lok Sabha Election), though of a smaller magnitude 
than in state-level elections (Hypothesis #3).  
Yet, elections in some states coincide with national elections; for instance, the last three state 
assembly elections in Andhra Pradesh (in 1999, 2004 and 2009) have coincided with national 
parliamentary elections. In those instances, which we refer to as dual elections (Dual Election), 
the need for election finance will be greater; therefore, we expect the magnitude of the 
contraction to be larger than if only a state or national election is being held (Hypothesis #4).  
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Finally, more urbanized states are comparatively richer; are more likely to possess well-
developed real estate markets; and have higher demand for construction—and therefore, 
cement—than their rural counterparts. As a result, linkages between politicians and builders 
are likely to be more intense in urban states (Urban). Thus, we expect that the negative 
impact of elections on cement consumption should be stronger in more urban states 
(Hypothesis #5). 
4. Data and methods 
To test our hypotheses, we construct a novel dataset of monthly data on cement 
consumption, disaggregated by state. The source of the data is the Cement Manufacturers’ 
Association of India (CMA), an industry trade group whose members include the country’s 
largest public and private sector cement manufacturers. One of CMA’s primary roles is to 
serve as a comprehensive clearinghouse for information on the capacity, production, 
dispatch and export of cement, using data collected from its member companies. CMA’s 
data are proprietary but were provided to the authors by a member company. Monthly data 
on cement consumption (measured in metric tons) is available from April 1995 to March 
2010, for a total of 180 calendar months per state. We utilize data on cement consumption, 
rather than production, because our hypotheses on electoral cycles revolve around 
contractions in liquidity in the real estate sector, which is heavily dependent on the use of 
cement. In other words, we do not make any claims about linkages between electoral politics 
and the supply of cement (production).17  
India is a federal parliamentary democracy comprised of 28 states and 7 union territories. 
For our analysis on cement consumption, we focus on the 17 major states of the union, 
which account for over 92 percent of the country’s population, for several reasons. First, we 
do not include data from the three new states created in 2000 (Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and 
Uttarakhand) because we cannot disaggregate data on cement consumption before their 
creation. Second, we ignore several small microstates, which we treat as special cases because 
their economies are not comparable to their larger peers. Third, we do not consider the 
union territories for a similar reason and because they do not have elected assemblies.18 
However, we do include the union territory of Delhi because it does have its own elected 
assembly and is a major economic center. According to data from 2009-2010, cement 
consumption in the 17 major states accounts for 90 percent of the all-India total. Thus, we 
are comfortable that we are working with data that has considerable explanatory power.  
                                                       
17 Having said that, we are aware of the numerous direct political connections many of India’s largest 
cement firms possess. Several of India’s major cement firms are owned by the Birla family, one of the country’s 
most storied business dynasties, while one of the other major sectoral players is the state-owned Cement 
Corporation of India, Ltd. 
18 Union territories are directly administered by the central government, with the exception of Delh and 
Puducherry.  
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To our dataset on cement consumption, we add information on state elections. Data on the 
frequency and timing of elections comes from the ECI. Between April 1995 and March 
2010, there were a total of 52 state elections across India’s 17 major states as well as five 
national parliamentary elections (1996, 1998, 1999 and 2004, 2009). Roughly one-quarter of 
all state elections in our dataset coincide with parliamentary elections. State assembly 
elections take place every five years, although a state assembly can be dissolved before the 
conclusion of its full term and early elections can be called. Of the 52 state elections in our 
dataset, only 9 were unscheduled (roughly 17 percent). Of the 5 national elections, 2 were 
unscheduled.  
To test for electoral cycles in cement consumption, we adapt the model used by Akhmedov 
and Zhuravskaya (2004) in their study of opportunistic political business cycles in Russia. 
These authors construct a dataset of elections and monthly budgetary expenditures in 
Russia’s states in order to identify the influence of political opportunism on government 
spending. Although their subject is different, their model suits our empirical puzzle quite 
nicely. Specifically, we estimate the following equation using regional monthly panel data: 

logyit   jm jit 1yit1
j{6;6}
 t  fis it
,      (1) 
where i identifies states, t represents the month of the year, and y stands for the level of 
cement consumption (in log terms) in a given state-month (Log Cement Consumption). 

m jit is 
an indicator variable that equals one, when t is j months away from the state election. Our 
model includes time fixed effects, 

t, where there is an indicator for each month-year. This 
fixed effects parameter controls for unobserved national-level trends as well as any general 
macroeconomic shocks. As in Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), we also need to control 
for state-specific fixed effects as well as any state-specific seasonal or time shocks. Hence, we 
include the fixed effects term, 

fis, for each of the twelve calendar months of the year (s) in 
each state, i. 
Our primary variable of interest is 

m jit when j = 0, which signifies the month of the state 
election (Election). In the base specification, we also include dummies for each of the six 
months preceding and following a state election (Election-1, Election-2, etc). A negative 
coefficient on 

 j when j = 0 would provide support for our hypothesis that the occurrence 
of a state election is associated with a drop in cement consumption.  
Finally, we include a lag of our dependent variable, 

yit1, in the model because we want to 
explicitly model the temporal dependence in our data. We believe there are strong theoretical 
reasons for expecting that cement consumption in a given month is likely to be influenced  
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by earlier levels of consumption. Furthermore, we are concerned about the presence of serial 
correlation in the data, so including a lag makes sense from a modeling perspective.19  
Using the Akaike information criterion (AIC), we tested for optimal lag selection. In half of 
the diagnostic tests (run separately for each state), the results suggested we should include 
three lags of the dependent variable, while half of the tests indicated we should include four 
lags. The regressions below include three lags, but the results do not change if we include 
four lags (results available on request). In addition, we tested for unit roots using the test 
developed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). Based on the mean of the individual Dickey-
Fuller t-statistics of each unit in the panel, the Im-Pesaran-Shin test assumes that all series 
are non-stationary under the null hypothesis. Based on the test statistics, we can reject the 
null hypothesis of non-stationarity. We estimate all models using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), using the correction for panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) suggested by Beck 
and Katz (1995) to deal with non-spherical errors (heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation).  
5. Results 
5.1 Baseline analysis 
Summary statistics for the data used in this cement analysis can be found in Table 1.  
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
Election  3060  0.02  0.13  0  1 
Scheduled election  3060  0.01  0.12  0  1 
Lok Sabha election  3060  0.03  0.16  0  1 
Scheduled Lok Sabha election  3060  0.02  0.13  0  1 
Dual election  3060  0.00  0.06  0  1 
Log cement consumption  3060  5.97  0.87  2.59  7.76 
Urban  3060  0.53  0.50  0  1 
Log cement production  2698  5.44  1.73  0  8.07 
 
First, we proceed with our baseline series of multivariate regressions in which we estimate 
the effect of state elections on (log) cement consumption. As seen in Column 1 of Table 2 
we begin by estimating our model without any fixed effects parameters and only including 
indicator variables for the election month and the six months before and after. The 
                                                       
19 We tested for serial correlation using Wooldridge’s test for serial correlation in linear panel data using the 
Stata command, -xtserial-. The results indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in 
the data.  
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regression results indicate that state elections are associated with a 12 percent decline in 
cement consumption. There is a slight increase in cement consumption immediately after the 
election, but otherwise the coefficient of the election lags and leads are insignificant.  
This simple specification does not control for time trends, so in Column 2 we add time fixed 
effects—or indicator variables for every month-year combination. In Column 3, we include 
only state-month fixed effects to account for state-specific seasonality in construction 
activity. Finally, in Column 4, we include both time and seasonal fixed effects parameters (as 
in Equation 1 above). Across all models, our results show that the occurrence of a state 
election is associated with a statistically significant decline in cement consumption (p<.01).  
Table 2: Baseline estimates of the effect of state elections on cement consumption 










         
election-6  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.06 
  [0.78]  [0.73]  [1.54]  [2.69]*** 
election-5  -0.01  0.00  -0.02  0.00 
  [0.42]  [0.04]  [0.88]  [0.03] 
election-4  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 
  [0.12]  [0.38]  [0.84]  [0.69] 
election-3  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
  [1.08]  [1.19]  [1.21]  [1.55] 
election-2  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.01 
  [1.27]  [1.24]  [0.83]  [0.55] 
election-1  0.04  0.02  -0.01  0.01 
  [1.38]  [0.85]  [0.31]  [0.21] 
election  -0.12  -0.12  -0.12  -0.13 
  [4.12]***  [4.71]***  [4.87]***  [5.44]*** 
election+1  0.09  0.05  0.03  0.03 
  [2.95]***  [1.97]**  [1.33]  [1.29] 
election+2  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.03 
  [0.82]  [1.50]  [1.19]  [1.17] 
election+3  0.03  0.04  0.07  0.04 
  [0.89]  [1.40]  [3.06]***  [1.56] 
election+4  -0.01  -0.02  0.03  0.01 
  [0.28]  [0.57]  [1.16]  [0.63] 
election+5  -0.04  -0.01  0.02  0.04 
  [1.46]  [0.25]  [0.98]  [1.82]* 
election+6  -0.03  -0.04  -0.01  0.01 
  [1.05]  [1.65]*  [0.51]  [0.20] 
         
Fixed effects?  -  Time  State-Month 
Time +  
State-Month 
Observations  2856  2856  2856  2856 
Number of states  17  17  17  17 
R-squared  0.95  0.96  0.97  0.97 
Note: Z statistics in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All models 
include three lags of the dependent variable.  Models are estimated using OLS with panel-corrected standard 
errors.  Dependent variable is natural log of cement consumption 
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According to our estimates, the presence of an election is associated with a 12-13 percent 
decline in the level of cement consumption. The estimates for the coefficient on the election 
indicator are strikingly similar across models, both in terms of magnitude and statistical 
significance. In the full specification (Column 4), almost every other indicator variable 
marking the months before and after the election is insignificant (with the exception of the 
dummies for the six month-lag and five month-lead). The results demonstrate a clear, 
election-related decline. Figure 1 plots the coefficient estimates obtained in Column 4 of 
Table 2. The figure starkly demonstrates the decline in cement consumption during the 
month of elections, relative to the months before and after. 
Figure 1: Coefficient plot of effect of state elections on cement consumption 
 
 
Note: Coefficients on variables taken from Column 4 of Table 2.  Circles represent point estimates and 
horizontal bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 
We want to ensure that our core result is not an artifact of the number of leading and lagging 
months that we decide to control for. To address this concern, we re-estimate the model 
including both sets of fixed effects, but iteratively add in dummies for the election lags and 
leads. The results, reported in Table 3, indicate that the negative effect of elections is 
consistently robust as we increase the number of controls for lagging and leading months—
beginning with one month before and after the election and moving to six months before 
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Table 3: Baseline estimates of the effect of state elections on cement consumptions, varying lags and leads 














election-6            0.06 
            [2.69]*** 
election-5          0.00  0.00 
          [0.04]  [0.03] 
election-4        -0.02  -0.01  -0.02 
        [0.66]  [0.62]  [0.69] 
election-3      -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
      [1.39]  [1.43]  [1.55]  [1.55] 
election-2    0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
    [0.46]  [0.48]  [0.53]  [0.50]  [0.55] 
election-1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
  [0.10]  [0.09]  [0.13]  [0.15]  [0.20]  [0.21] 
election  -0.12  -0.12  -0.12  -0.12  -0.12  -0.13 
  [5.46]***  [5.46]***  [5.45]***  [5.48]***  [5.47]***  [5.44]*** 
election+1  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
  [1.42]  [1.43]  [1.42]  [1.49]  [1.34]  [1.29] 
election+2    0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
    [1.39]  [1.32]  [1.26]  [1.22]  [1.17] 
election+3      0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04 
      [1.56]  [1.49]  [1.54]  [1.56] 
election+4        0.01  0.01  0.01 
        [0.46]  [0.53]  [0.63] 
election+5          0.04  0.04 
          [1.72]*  [1.82]* 
election+6            0.01 
            [0.20] 














Observations  2992  2975  2958  2924  2890  2856 
Number of 
states  17  17  17  17  17  17 
R-squared  0.98  0.98  0.97  0.98  0.97  0.97 
 
  
  18 
and after. Indeed, in results not reported here, the results are consistent even if we include 
dummies for a larger set of months before and after the election.20 
5.2 Scheduled elections 
We hypothesized that the contraction in cement consumption will be larger for scheduled 
elections because they provide politicians and builders with some degree of certainty that 
allows them to coordinate activities. It is also important to distinguish between scheduled 
and unscheduled elections because election timing is not strictly exogenous. Hence, there is a 
concern that governments might call early elections for some reason that might also be 
correlated with changes in the economy that could impact the demand for cement. Our 
results for scheduled elections can be found in Column 1 of Table 4. Even when using this 
restricted measure, the occurrence of state elections continues to have a negative effect on 
cement consumption. In line with our expectations, the coefficient on the scheduled state 
election variable is slightly larger than when we considered all state elections (scheduled or 
not). Cement consumption declines by 15 percent during the month of scheduled elections 
(p<.01).  
5.3 Dual elections 
We hypothesized that there should be a stronger negative effect of elections on cement 
consumption in those states that are experiencing simultaneous state and national elections. 
As Column 2 of Table 4 attests, the negative effect of dual elections on cement 
consumption is nearly three times as strong as that of state elections (and more than twice as 
strong as unscheduled state elections). Dual elections are associated with a 38 percent drop 
in the level of cement consumption (p<.01). This result suggests the imperative for election 
finance is significantly larger when candidates for state and national elections need to raise 
funds for their respective campaigns simultaneously.  
5.4 Urban-rural states 
We hypothesized that the effect of elections of cement consumption should be larger in 
urban states. To classify states, we take advantage of population figures provided in the 1991 
and 2001 census. We use the urban/rural population figures from the 1991 census to create 
a dichotomous indicator for urban/rural states for the years 1995-2000. Using the 2001 
census, we do the same for the years 2001-2010. We code states as urban if their urban 
population is above the median for all states, and rural otherwise.21 Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 4 confirm our hypothesis. While elections are associated with a decline in cement 
                                                       
20 The estimates are remarkably consistent when we control for up to 11 months of lags and leads. When 
we control for the 12 months lagging and leading the election, the size of the effect declines as does the 
significance (p<.05).  
21 The classification for the two periods is identical, with the exception of Haryana—which moves in to the 
“urban” category after 2001.  
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consumption in both urban and rural states, the effect is much stronger for urban states (15 
percent decline versus 11 percent) as well as more significant. 
Table 4: Disaggregating estimates of the effect of elections on cement consumption, 
by election type 










Sample:      Urban states  Rural states 
         
election-6  0.06  0.05  0.09  0.06 
  [2.76]***  [2.06]**  [3.12]***  [1.53] 
election-5  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.01 
  [0.04]  [0.45]  [0.00]  [0.39] 
election-4  -0.02  -0.01  0.03  -0.06 
  [0.67]  [0.46]  [0.85]  [1.69]* 
election-3  -0.03  -0.02  -0.04  -0.03 
  [1.55]  [1.00]  [1.44]  [0.86] 
election-2  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.04 
  [0.54]  [0.96]  [0.04]  [1.03] 
election-1  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
  [0.19]  [0.26]  [0.12]  [0.09] 
election    -0.02  -0.15  -0.11 
    [1.05]  [4.95]***  [3.04]*** 
election+1  0.03  0.02  0.06  -0.01 
  [1.27]  [1.06]  [1.91]*  [0.17] 
election+2  0.03  0.01  0.05  0.00 
  [1.20]  [0.56]  [1.77]*  [0.10] 
election+3  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.02 
  [1.56]  [2.61]***  [2.21]**  [0.50] 
election+4  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.03 
  [0.63]  [1.29]  [0.34]  [0.74] 
election+5  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.01 
  [1.87]*  [1.17]  [1.78]*  [0.38] 
election+6  0.00  0.00  0.02  -0.01 
  [0.20]  [0.17]  [0.66]  [0.20] 
scheduled_election  -0.15       
  [5.58]***       
dual_election    -0.38     
    [5.86]***     
lok_sabha_election    0.00     
    [0.10]     
         
Fixed effects? 
Time +  
State-Month 
Year +  
State-Month 
Time +  
State-Month 
Time +  
State-Month 
Observations  2856  2856  1512  1344 
Number of states  17  17  9  8 
R-squared  0.97  0.97  0.92  0.98 
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Table 5: Estimates of the effect of national elections on cement consumption 
 












           
Lok Sabha election-6  0.03  0.04  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01 
  [0.67]  [0.91]  [1.12]  [0.34]  [0.30] 
Lok Sabha election-5  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.02  0.02 
  [0.39]  [0.65]  [0.11]  [0.60]  [0.62] 
Lok Sabha election-4  0.08  0.09  0.04  0.05  0.05 
  [1.93]*  [2.06]**  [1.45]  [2.01]**  [2.07]** 
Lok Sabha election-3  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.02 
  [1.26]  [1.14]  [0.59]  [0.88]  [0.82] 
Lok Sabha election-2  -0.02  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.01 
  [0.46]  [0.40]  [0.06]  [0.48]  [0.54] 
Lok Sabha election-1  0.04  0.03  -0.05  -0.04  -0.04 
  [0.96]  [0.77]  [2.04]**  [1.50]  [1.55] 
Lok Sabha election  -0.10  -0.10  -0.06  -0.05   
  [2.58]***  [2.37]**  [2.26]**  [2.01]**   
Lok Sabha election+1  0.03  0.03  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04 
  [0.81]  [0.63]  [1.51]  [1.48]  [1.52] 
Lok Sabha election+2  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00 
  [0.03]  [0.06]  [0.51]  [0.26]  [0.16] 
Lok Sabha election+3  0.03  0.02  0.07  0.06  0.06 
  [0.64]  [0.48]  [2.76]***  [2.56]**  [2.58]*** 
Lok Sabha election+4  -0.04  -0.05  0.02  0.04  0.03 
  [1.14]  [1.07]  [0.93]  [1.40]  [1.34] 
Lok Sabha election+5  -0.05  -0.05  -0.02  -0.01  0.00 
  [1.35]  [1.26]  [0.83]  [0.23]  [0.15] 
Lok Sabha election+6  0.02  0.02  -0.03  0.00  0.00 
  [0.56]  [0.52]  [1.02]  [0.11]  [0.14] 
Scheduled Lok Sabha election        -0.08 
          [2.56]** 
           
Fixed effects?  -  Year  State-Month 
Year + 
State-Month 
Year +  
State-Month 
Observations  2856  2856  2856  2856  2856 
Number of states  17  17  17  17  17 
R-squared  0.95  0.95  0.97  0.97  0.97 
 
 
Note: Z statistics in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All models include three lags of 
the dependent variable.  Models are estimated using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors.  Dependent variable is natural log of 
cement consumption. 
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5.5 National elections 
Thus far, we have focused on the effect of state assembly elections on cement consumption. 
In Table 5, we explore the impact of national elections on cement consumption. As 
hypothesized previously, we expect that the negative effect of elections on cement 
consumption will be significant, though smaller, for national elections given that both land 
and real estate/construction are regulated at the state-level. To estimate the effect of national 
elections on cement consumption, we use a slightly different empirical model. Namely, we 
can no longer include a full set of month-year fixed effects to account for the time trend 
because the indicator for Lok Sabha (national) elections does not vary across states (e.g. 
national elections are a common “shock” simultaneously experienced by all states in a given 
month-year). Thus, in the regressions we can only include fixed effects for years as well as 
for each state-month combination (e.g. seasonal time effects). Column 1 of Table 5 reports 
the results of the baseline model (with no fixed effects). According to this basic 
specification, national elections are associated with a 10 percent decline in cement 
consumption (p<.01). In Columns 2 and 3, we add year fixed effects and seasonal effects, 
respectively. The result holds although the coefficient is smaller (-.06) once seasonal effects 
are included. In Column 4, we include both sets of fixed effects and the results here indicate 
that national elections are associated with a 5 percent decline in the level of cement 
consumption (p<.05). As for scheduled national elections, we find that the negative impact is 
slightly more pronounced, as shown in Column 5. This effect is analogous to the differential 
impact of scheduled versus unscheduled state elections. Column 5 reports an 8 percent 
decline in cement consumption for scheduled national parliamentary elections (p<.05). 
5.6 Randomization inference 
To build confidence in our result, we make use of randomization inference, which is a non-
parametric method of hypothesis testing that does not rely on asymptotic properties or 
distributional assumptions regarding the error terms in a model. This is particularly relevant 
to our case, as we are working with panel data where we are likely to have “clustering” or 
correlation among error terms within a particular group (in our case, states). In the models 
described above, we addressed this issue using panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Yet, 
we might be concerned about the robustness of these estimates as we have a relatively small 
number of clusters (states).  
The basic procedure of conducting a randomization test is relatively straightforward and 
proceeds in four steps, as outlined by Rader (2011).22 First, we estimate our baseline model 
using OLS. We record the t-statistic on our election variable. Next, rather than taking the t-
statistic on our variable of interest at face value, we shuffle the variable. By randomizing the 
election month variable, we are theoretically breaking any systematic connection between it 
and the dependent variable. In the next step, we use this shuffled variable (in place of the 
                                                       
22 One recent empirical application of randomization inference in political science is Erikson, Pinto and 
Rader (2010).  
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observed variable) to re-estimate the model. We repeat the randomization and estimation 
1,000 times. By doing this, we create a reference distribution of t-statistics that would arise if 
the null hypothesis were true. Finally, we can compare the observed t-statistic with the 
reference distribution to determine what percentage of the time we observe a significant, 
spurious effect. If the observed t-statistic is larger than 95 percent of the simulated t-
statistics, we can be confident in rejecting the null hypothesis of no relationship between 
elections and cement consumption.  
We use the model in Column 4 of Table 2 as our baseline regression, but without using the 
correction for panel-corrected standard errors. The t-statistic on the election variable is 5.21. 
Figure 2 graphically demonstrates the reference distribution of 1,000 t-statistics we obtained 
from the randomization test. The vertical reference line indicates the t-statistic on our 
baseline model. As the figure demonstrates, more than 95 percent of the time we obtain 
results that are of lesser statistical significance than in our baseline model.  
Figure 2: Randomization test results 
 
 
Note: Baseline model used to obtain original estimated t-statistic adapted from Column 4 of Table 2.  The 
difference in t-statistics reported there and in this figure is due to the fact that we do not use panel-corrected 
standard errors when conducting the randomization test.  Otherwise, the underlying models are identical. 
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6. Robustness 
Thus far, we have demonstrated empirically that there is a robust, negative relationship 
between cement consumption and elections. We believe this is suggestive of real estate’s role 
as a key financier of elections. In this section we address three of the most obvious 
challenges to our interpretation of the results.  
6.1 Economic uncertainty 
What if the decline in cement consumption is not symptomatic of the real estate sector’s role 
as a conduit for election finance, but instead the outcome of a broad decline in economic 
activity arising out of political uncertainty that often precedes elections? For instance, Canes-
Wrone and Park (2010) argue that, in OECD countries, the political uncertainty associated 
with elections induces private sector actors to postpone investments with high costs of 
reversal. Hence, elections are associated with a decline in economic activity—a “reverse 
business cycle”—as opposed to an economic expansion predicted by the literature on 
opportunistic cycles.  
Our results do not support such a view in the context of India for three reasons. First, we 
find that there is a decline in cement consumption in both scheduled as well as unscheduled 
elections. One would expect, given the uncertainty attached to unscheduled elections (often 
sparked by political instability) that the pace of economic activity might naturally slow down 
as business grapples with a potential change in government. Nonetheless, we find the decline 
in cement consumption is larger in scheduled elections, when there is arguably less uncertainty.  
Second, as an additional robustness test, we run our empirical model using monthly data on 
cement production, rather than cement consumption, as our dependent variable. Recall, we 
are primarily interested in election shocks to cement consumption (demand). If builders face 
a liquidity shock during elections, we should not necessarily detect any systematic effect on 
cement production (supply).23 But if production significantly declines during elections itself, 
one could contend that our results on consumption are merely symptomatic of a larger 
economic or sectoral cycle (rather than a demand-side shock).  
As demonstrated by Table 6, we find no clear evidence of an electoral cycle in cement 
production. Across all models, state elections are not associated with a significant change in 
cement production. The results are also displayed in graphical form in Figure 3. The 
coefficients on our election indicator variable are positive when we include the fixed effects 
parameters, though they do not reach statistical significance. As for the months preceding 
the elections, there does appear to be a contraction in production three months prior to the 
elections. However, this decline is only half as large as the consumption decline we observe 
                                                       
23 Of course, it is plausible that cement producers will anticipate a decline in consumption and cut 
production prior to elections. If this were the case, we should expect that some of the dummies for months 
preceding elections to be positive and significant.  
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around elections. Furthermore, there are signs of a slight growth in cement production two 
months prior to the elections. Overall, we can conclude that there is no indication of an 
overall economic shock during the month of elections. 
Table 6: Estimates of the effects of state elections on cement production 
 










         
Election-6  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02 
  [0.24]  [0.92]  [0.67]  [0.73] 
Election-5  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.04 
  [0.50]  [0.45]  [0.69]  [1.31] 
Election-4  0.00  0.00  -0.04  -0.04 
  [0.02]  [0.03]  [1.63]  [1.35] 
Election-3  -0.03  -0.02  -0.06  -0.06 
  [0.88]  [0.79]  [2.17]**  [2.18]** 
Election-2  0.11  0.08  0.07  0.05 
  [3.31]***  [2.74]***  [2.40]**  [1.71]* 
Election-1  0.01  -0.04  -0.03  -0.04 
  [0.20]  [1.18]  [1.11]  [1.56] 
Election  -0.03  0.03  0.01  0.03 
  [0.88]  [0.91]  [0.23]  [1.04] 
Election+1  0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.01 
  [0.27]  [0.54]  [0.16]  [0.47] 
Election+2  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03 
  [1.37]  [1.43]  [0.44]  [1.12] 
Election+3  -0.02  -0.02  0.01  -0.02 
  [0.53]  [0.63]  [0.47]  [0.60] 
Election+4  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.02 
  [0.30]  [0.21]  [1.19]  [0.83] 
Election+5  -0.03  -0.01  0.01  0.01 
  [0.83]  [0.41]  [0.52]  [0.37] 
Election+6  0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
  [0.14]  [0.25]  [0.08]  [0.07] 
         
Fixed effects?  -  Time  State-Month 
Time +  
State-Month 
Observations  2514  2514  2514  2514 
Number of states  15  15  15  15 
R-squared  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
 
Note: Z statistics in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All models 
include two lags of the dependent variable.  Models are estimated using OLS with panel-corrected standard 
errors.  Dependent variable is natural log of cement consumption.  Delhi and Haryana are dropped due to 
missing data. 
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Figure 3: Coefficient plot of effect of state elections on cement production 
 
 
Note: Coefficients on variables taken from Column 4 of Table 6.  Circles represent point estimates and 
horizontal bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 
Third, we can utilize data on the level of industrial production to examine whether the 
decline in cement consumption is robust to controlling for the pace of general economic 
activity. To control for the state of the economy, we utilize the index of industrial 
production (IIP), an aggregate statistic that represents the status of production in the 
industrial sector for a given period of time compared to a previous reference period. Since 
the IIP is a national-level measure, we cannot use this data to analyze state elections. 
However, we can use it as a control in our regressions looking at national elections. The 
inclusion of the IIP variable does not substantively alter our estimates of the negative effect 
of national elections on cement consumption (as seen in Table 7).  
Finally, it is worth noting that the argument that general economic activity contracts on 
account of election-induced uncertainty stands in contrast to much of the literature on 
political business cycles in developing countries. Indeed, the literature on opportunistic 
business cycles suggests that policymakers in developing democracies induce short-term 
economic expansions (and increase deficits) before elections (Brender and Drazen 2005; Shi 
and Svensson 2006). Studies of India have reached similar conclusions (Cole 2008; Khemani 
2004).   
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Table 7: Estimates of the effect of national elections on cement consumption, 
controlling for IIP 










         
Lok Sabha election-6  0.03  0.04  -0.02  0.00 
  [0.73]  [0.90]  [0.83]  [0.03] 
Lok Sabha election-5  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.02 
  [0.45]  [0.66]  [0.06]  [0.67] 
Lok Sabha election-4  0.08  0.09  0.04  0.05 
  [1.98]**  [2.07]**  [1.52]  [2.16]** 
Lok Sabha election-3  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.03 
  [1.31]  [1.12]  [0.75]  [1.04] 
Lok Sabha election-2  -0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.01 
  [0.41]  [0.41]  [0.28]  [0.57] 
Lok Sabha election-1  0.04  0.03  -0.04  -0.04 
  [1.01]  [0.75]  [1.71]*  [1.44] 
Lok Sabha election  -0.10  -0.10  -0.05  -0.05 
  [2.53]**  [2.36]**  [2.18]**  [2.00]** 
Lok Sabha election+1  0.03  0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
  [0.86]  [0.62]  [1.43]  [1.22] 
Lok Sabha election+2  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
  [0.07]  [0.06]  [0.24]  [0.17] 
Lok Sabha election+3  0.03  0.02  0.06  0.06 
  [0.67]  [0.49]  [2.56]**  [2.39]** 
Lok Sabha election+4  -0.04  -0.05  0.02  0.03 
  [1.11]  [1.06]  [0.90]  [1.09] 
Lok Sabha election+5  -0.05  -0.05  -0.02  -0.01 
  [1.32]  [1.25]  [0.79]  [0.55] 
Lok Sabha election+6  0.03  0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
  [0.64]  [0.52]  [0.45]  [0.19] 
IIP  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  [0.79]  [0.11]  [10.55]***  [2.46]** 
         
Fixed effects?  -  Year  State-Month 
Year +  
State-Month 
Observations  2856  2856  2856  2856 
Number of states  17  17  17  17 
R-squared  0.95  0.95  0.97  0.97 
 
Note: Z statistics in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All models 
include three lags of the dependent variable.  Models are estimated using OLS with panel-corrected standard 
errors.  Dependent variable is natural log of cement consumption.  
 
6.2 Consumption smoothing 
Another possible objection to our findings relates to the behavior of builders. For instance, 
if builders anticipate the future need to redirect funds to election campaigns, why wouldn’t  
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they take action to smooth their consumption? After all, private firms (and economic agents, 
in general) are said to prefer a stable consumption path over time. Thus, if firms know that 
their consumption will likely decline in the future, they should anticipate this by gradually 
redirecting funds over time rather than waiting for the month of elections. 
While an impulse to “smooth” consumption makes sense in theory, we argue that it does not 
happen in practice for two reasons. First, politicians provide funds to builders precisely 
because they need a place to hide their assets from scrutiny. If builders redirected funds to 
politicians in installments, it would undermine politicians’ incentives to move the assets off 
their balance sheets this way. Instead, politicians want funds during election season because 
they can route these funds into campaigns immediately, without keeping them on their own 
books.  
Second, because builders operate in a “black money” environment, there are constraints on 
their liquidity that hamper their ability to smooth consumption. There are three reasons for 
this. First, as was mentioned earlier, banks are generally cautious about lending to the real 
estate sector. For instance, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) regulations mandate that banks’ 
exposure to real estate lending be no more than 15 percent of a bank’s total deposits (RBI 
2009).24 Indeed, it is instructive to note that while the U.S. economy was severely hampered 
by a mortgage-lending crisis in 2007-8, India avoided a similar fate thanks to conservative 
lending practices and increased regulation in sectors such as real estate. Second, banks are 
unlikely to provide builders with financing to address liquidity constraints in advance of 
elections when the underlying motivations are expressly political. Third, election-season 
borrowing is likely to be costly for builders because the cost of borrowing will increase if the 
general demand for credit is higher as elections approach.  
Of course, it is also possible that builders accept that idea that providing election finance—
and thus facing a short-term liquidity shortage—is part of the cost of doing business in a 
highly regulated economy. Builders may be willing to put up with a temporary slowdown in 
building activity if they are reaping benefits from the state in other ways. 
6.3 Model code of conduct 
A third possible objection to our findings concerns the rules of the ECI. From the time 
elections are announced to the date results are made public, the ECI enforces a “model code 
of conduct,” which is a set of guidelines that govern the conduct of the incumbent 
government as well as parties and candidates taking part in elections. One of the motivations 
of the model code is to create a level playing field so that the government does not exploit 
the benefits of incumbency for electoral purposes.  
                                                       
24 Indeed, Patnaik, Shah and Suri (2011) find that penetration of commercial finance in the real estate sector 
is very low in India.  
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One might argue that the decrease in cement consumption during the month of elections is 
a direct result of the enforcement of the model code because it constrains the ability of the 
government to carry out its regular business, which could include a variety of infrastructure 
projects. Yet the model code only restricts the government from announcing new schemes 
and projects in advance of the elections (Singh 2011). It has no bearing on the government’s 
undertaking of existing projects. Given the time lag inherent in tenders, contracts, siting, etc. 
we do not think this is biasing our results. 
Furthermore, governments are likely to be strategic (especially when elections take place as 
scheduled) in announcing new schemes prior to the formal enforcement of the model code 
prior to elections. Doing so allows them to minimize the possibility of a slowdown in 
projects come election time. For instance, as elections approach the incumbent government 
has an incentive to get as much money out to contractors working on ongoing government 
contracts (the quid pro quo is that contractors often lend their vehicles for campaigns). This 
is consistent with Khemani (2004), who finds election-related increases in public investment 
spending and spending on road expansion using subnational data from India.25 
7. Conclusion 
The presence of black money is a well-known feature of elections in many developing 
democracies. Yet due to its opacity, much of what we know about illicit election finance is 
based on anecdotal evidence or journalistic investigations. This paper represents a 
contribution to a new literature, which seeks to use new or innovative sources of data to 
demonstrate empirically —and quantify—the flows of black money in elections. 
The role of the real estate sector in providing off-the-books campaign contributions to 
politicians has been a hallmark in many developing economies due to the nature of state 
regulations governing land use. This paper uses variation in the demand for cement to 
demonstrate the presence of an electoral cycle in building activity, using data from India. 
This effect is consistent with the belief that the sector serves as a key conduit of black 
money in elections. Using a variety of models, we demonstrate that our key empirical finding 
is robust. Furthermore, we address what we see are the leading objections to our 
interpretation of the underlying mechanism.  
We believe that this work has several implications for the field of political economy. First, 
scholars need to pay greater attention to the role black money is playing across the 
developing world. If there are large sums of money moving through the political system 
independent of official expenditures, our estimates of election finance will be downward-
                                                       
25 One interpretation of our finding is that building activity slows down during elections because laborers in 
the real estate sector are being used as temporary labor for campaigns. This is an interesting hypothesis for which 
we would need additional data; but we believe this can be seen in our framework as an “in-kind” contribution 
from builders.  
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biased if we do not take them into account. To date, much of the comparative literature 
focuses on licit flows (see Scarrow 2007 for a review), but such flows likely constitute but a 
fraction of total election spending in many developing countries.  
Second, the growing expense of elections has serious implications for public policy in 
developing countries. Raising money from “supporters” has the potential effect of post-
election paybacks in terms of distorting public policies. Indeed, the builder-politician nexus 
has implications for decisions on land acquisition and conversion; land and housing prices 
and land inequality; and the overall public management of urbanization.26  
Third, election finance (its sources and methods) has ramifications for how democracy 
functions. In principle, greater political competition, decentralization (i.e. greater number of 
elected sub-national bodies), and more frequent elections can enhance citizen accountability 
of elected representatives. But each of these benefits also comes with a financial cost with 
respect to increasing electoral expenditure. While one could argue that costly elections can 
serve as a screening device to weed out non-serious candidates, if privileged access to 
resources becomes a pre-condition for winning election, this could have obvious effects on 
the nature of political selection. Finally, there is the troubling prospect of the long-term 
cognitive implications if election financing results in negative selection effects and a broader 
corruption of the body politic. If the resulting cynicism among voters leads them to lose 
faith in the democratic process, there will be little left to hold up the edifice itself. 
   
                                                       
26 The title of a recent article in the New York Times on Gurgaon, one of the fastest growing and richest 
cities in India, says it all: “In India Dynamism meets Dysfunction” (Yardley 2011).  
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